| From: | Jacob Champion <jacob(dot)champion(at)enterprisedb(dot)com> |
|---|---|
| To: | Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> |
| Cc: | "* Neustradamus *" <neustradamus(at)hotmail(dot)com>, PostgreSQL Hackers <pgsql-hackers(at)lists(dot)postgresql(dot)org> |
| Subject: | Re: RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 support |
| Date: | 2025-11-20 21:59:22 |
| Message-ID: | CAOYmi+k0N+fcrW=xz_bshwzjM5CkSFUzKjTa+xeoyohkXD8doQ@mail.gmail.com |
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| Lists: | pgsql-hackers |
On Thu, Nov 20, 2025 at 1:52 PM Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka(at)iki(dot)fi> wrote:
> PostgreSQL does support channel binding, with tls-server-end-point. I
> believe that sufficient to prevent an attack like that.
No, IIRC unique bindings (-unique and -exporter) prevent MITM even if
the attacker has the server's private key, as long as they do not also
possess the SCRAM verifiers. tls-server-end-point does not prevent
against that (so you can terminate TLS on a different node from the
verifiers).
--Jacob
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